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THE ANTITR UST MARA THON
Part IV: Remedies - How Far and How
Much?
SPENCER WALLER: We're going to conclude with our final panel
looking at the question of remedies, both public and private. Philip
will be our moderator.
PHILIP MARSDEN: We're going to be combining these two, which
makes a lot of sense. Anita had kindly prepared with George Addy a
paper on Remedies, How Far and How Much, which you had a
chance to review. It's a comparative approach to finding what I like
to describe as this idea of a precise scalpel rather than a blunt
sledgehammer, because in devising remedies or leaving it to the
courts to do so, we do have to try to work out how to crack the nut of
this difficult question we've been considering all day, the exquisite
question of trying to determine between exclusionary and efficient
conduct. Andre Fiebig is going to begin with the discussion of the
issues coming out of Anita's paper, and then Christopher Leslie will
lead us into a discussion of private actions.
ANDRE FIEBIG: Thank you, Philip. I want to start off my saying
that that I found Anita's paper quite good and thought-provoking. I
would like to pick up on two themes which she and George Addy
raised in the paper: divergent remedies and the the costs that are
imposed because of divergent remedies. Anita's paper correctly
points out that competition authorities and courts may come to not
only divergent substantive result, but even where there is agreement
on the illegality of the conduct at issue, there is often divergence in
the remedies employed. It is therefore appropriate to look at
divergence at both of these levels.
I think that this is what makes the Microsoft so salient for us: there
were two competition law systems which came to the same result on
illegality, but differed on the remedies to be put in place. The

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 20:2

underlying facts in the Microsoft case were pretty much the same on
both sides of the Atlantic. Using the same product market definition,
Microsoft's market share in the United States was close to what it
was in Europe. And the practices at issue were pretty much the same.
Hence, these similarities have apparently added to the willingness of
certain U.S. antitrust experts to criticize the conclusions reached by
the European Commission and the Court of First Instance.
But let's leave aside who is right and who is wrong. In my view,
there is seldom an objective right and wrong in antitrust cases. But
the reality of the matter is that the divergent remedies impose
additional costs on firms. Worldwide compliance with a unified
remedy would often be much easier for firms. The question then
becomes: what do we do about it? Does this mean that we should
coordinate remedies on an international scale?
In my view, coordination of remedies may be a laudable objective,
but harmonization of remedies an unachieveable objective. When
reading Anita's paper, my conclusion was that more effort should be
placed on making the application of the substantive rules clearer
rather than trying to harmonize remedies. I come to that conclusion
because I think the appropriateness of remedies is based on an almost
an infinite number of factors. Those factors include economic,
political and social considerations. For example, and as I mentioned
earlier, it is inappropriate to merely ask what effect a particular
practice or transaction will have on prices to the consumer. Quite
frankly, there may be situations where a higher price or less output is
a social benefit. In Europe, for example, the protection of the
environment and securing employment enjoy equal status in the EC
Treaty as the protection of competition. It is no wonder that there is
and will continue to be divergence in the remedies imposed in the
United States and in Europe.
PHILIP MARSDEN: Thanks very much. From a comparative
perspective one of the things that comes out most obviously in
Microsoft is where, as you say, the conduct is essentially the same
and the remedies are quite different. The arguments that were used in
the European case were not focused specifically - as other cases have
been in Europe - on the unique nature of Europe: segmented markets,
national consumer preferences, state-induced dominance, these sorts
of things. Software is very clearly a global product market. So the
Commission couldn't use the standard - and quite legitimate- usual
European excuses for having stricter regulation. So you've actually
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got to cut to the heart of it, which is, do we have a substantively
different approach in Europe on the theory of harm in abuse cases. So
one of the questions I want to throw out, and I'll turn it over to
Christopher, and then we'll begin the discussion, is what should
global firms be doing about this? To which standard should they be
conforming their conduct? Should they be conforming their conduct
to the strictest standard, the EU standard? And then also, what
should other authorities be doing, do they follow, or does it make any
sense for them to craft their own remedy for their own market? Does
it make any sense for them at all to allow some form of conduct
which another larger jurisdiction is going to prohibit?
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE: When Spencer asked me if I would be a
commentator on private enforcement, I said yes because it's pretty
easy to be a commentator. Read the paper, find what you agree with,
what you disagree with. And the expectations are much lower for a
commentator than a speaker. So I was sort of horrified two days ago
when I found out there wasn't a paper. But I'm still a commentator,
so I'd like to maintain that commentator low expectation by starting
off with the assertion that private enforcement isn't terribly important
in antitrust. I'd now like to comment on that, because I find that
assertion to be outrageous. (Laughter)
There are two primary goals for antitrust law and competition law.
First, compensation for the victims of antitrust violations and, second,
deterrence of future violations, either by that defendant or by other
defendants. Private enforcement is critical in achieving these two
goals. In the United States within the context of Section 2, this is
partly a function of the fact that the government just doesn't bring
that much Section 2 litigation because, as Spencer noted, it's focusing
so much more on Section 1 price-fixing cartels. With respect to the
two specific goals of antitrust law, compensation is much more likely
to be achieved through private litigation because you have the actual
victims of the antitrust violation suing for, usually, damages to get
some sort of compensation for the money they're out from the
monopoly overcharge. Private enforcement is the best way to put that
money back in their pockets. And private enforcement is also critical,
in my mind, to deterrence. Government actions, while important,
don't tend to disgorge the illegal monopoly profits. And in classic
cases like American Cani or Alcoa, where a Section 2 violation was
found, there's no remedy at all. So you got these illegal monopolies,
United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916).
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and yet even when you have a finding of liability, they're allowed to
keep all their monopoly profits that they got up until that point. And
that doesn't really create deterrence against future violations. Even in
the United States Microsoft case, although you have an excellent
opinion by the DC circuit, whatever you think of the structural
remedy, the fact is, Microsoft got to keep its illegal monopoly profits
that it "earned."
PETER CARSTENSEN: Extorted.
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE: Or, extorted, as Peter suggests. This
suggests that the government's not very good at disgorging the illgotten gains, and you're never going to have deterrence unless you
can disgorge the ill-gotten gains and hopefully actually have some
sort of penalty on top of that to make it so other firms will conclude
it's not going to be cost beneficial for them to violate the law in the
future. For private enforcement, that leaves the question of who can
bring antitrust suits, and that's primarily competitors and consumers.
Unfortunately, in the United States, it seems to me that standing
doctrine is being constrained in a way that's reducing the viability of
private enforcement from both of these sectors. With competitors,
you've got this mantra of antitrust protects competition, not
competitors. And some courts are misinterpreting that to suggest
antitrust doesn't protect competitors at all. There is sometimes a lack
of understanding regarding the relationship between the existence of
competitors and the process of competition.
Within the context of consumers, why courts are eliminating
consumer standing in some important areas of Section 2, like Walker
Process patent fraud cases 2 , where the majority of courts are denying
standing to direct consumers to sue for the overcharges they
admittedly paid to an illegal monopolist. And then we've got no
private enforcement in the United States or in federal court for
indirect consumers, even when those indirect consumers suffer the
lion's share of the antitrust injury, and even when they're the most
likely plaintiffs to disgorge the ill-gotten gains.
Antitrust standing doctrine needs to be revisited. On the one hand,
there is a legitimate fear of nuisance suits and consumers bringing too
2

See Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process

Litigation, 13 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 281 (2007).

2008]

PartIV. Remedies - How Farand How Much?

many suits, the people that used to bring frivolous securities fraud
litigation bringing frivolous Section 2 litigation, so you need to have
some limit on standing. On the other hand, the issue remains: how do
you have a meaningful limit to get the proper private enforcement
cases to court, while screening out the frivolous cases, and making
sure that you get enough of the proper cases litigated so that we can
achieve the twin goals of compensation, and deterrence.
KEN DAVIDSON: In over half of my time with the FTC, I worked
in the compliance division, which deals with remedy. We dealt with
it fairly frequently with the EU, and my experience was that we did
not have problems on making compatible remedies. Even when we
changed the remedies, the reasons were usually whatever was
originally ordered was impossible, and that was a fact which was
taken into account by the Europeans and the Americans when the
orders needed to be modified. Harmonization as a practical matter on
remedies has been the problem.
The second thing I'd like to say concerns Federal Trade Commission
orders, but also Microsoft and other cases. These decisions have
replaced structural remedies with conduct remedies. A merger case,
like Evanston, has a conduct remedy. This is insane. We have merger
cases in which we find the FTC ordered a 40-year supply contract to
take care of a competitive problem. This is not antitrust. This is the
road to regulation, in capital letters. Fines. I always hear about fines
when I go abroad because competition laws in transitional economies
are more likely to have adopted the European system of: we're going
to do fines, or even in criminal cases. Although there was a very
insightful fellow from the KFTC, the Korean Fair Trade
Commission, who said more than a few years ago, we can't do
criminal cases. It's a loss of face for the people, so we can't even
start a case. Well, I think that's a good point. But I think the real
problem with fines is that in order to make them effective, how big
do they have to be potentially? I mean, for Microsoft, you can't even
think in those terms. So I would agree with Christopher Leslie that
the appropriate way to go about the process of figuring what
somebody should pay ought to be disgorgement. Take away the
incentive to misuse market power.
Finally, you may want additional fines. I don't think they matter that
much, that the amount of money you're taking away in a
disgorgement proceeding is likely to far exceed anything you're
going to get in civil or criminal penalties. And our experience in the
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US, we had a presentation at AAI last week in which the person who
had looked at the numbers said, frankly, we find that the number of
cartel cases has gone up, the amount of money has gone up, and the
amount of recidivism has gone up. There's something wrong with
that picture.
JOSEPH BAUER: I was going to pick up on something that
Christopher said. I guess that it was intended to be provocative, but
also tongue in cheek: Should there be a role for private enforcement?
I think we all would agree the answer has to be yes.
The starting point should be the functions of remedies. First of all, to
the extent that a court finds that the firm or firms have engaged in
anticompetitive behavior or monopolistic behavior, the courts will
attempt to either create or recreate competition. Then, certainly,
there is the interest in obtaining compensation for the victims. And,
to the extent that compensation, or the fear of having to pay
compensation, advances deterrence, it hopefully has an effect on
other firms that are contemplating similar behavior.
So if I can just parse those goals. With respect to creating or
recreating competition, presumably, the principal advocate for that
will be the government.
But, the principal advocates for
compensation and deterrence are likely to be private parties.
Although, as Ken says, to the extent that fines are a different way of
shifting money, maybe not from the defendant to the victims, but
from the defendant to the public coffers, that certainly also has
deterrent effects.
Peter was talking a little bit about different kinds of remedies, and we
can agree that there's no one size fits all, no one shoe that works for
everybody's foot. If you look at antitrust history, the majority of
relief decreed has been injunctive. And these can be nuanced.
Courts often recognize that a breakup might not be the best way to
achieve some of the goals that we've talked about, that breakup may
not be very good for restoring competition.
One example is the United Shoe Machinery3 case, one of the classic
monopoly cases from the '50s, where the government was certainly
successful there.
Incidentally, that's another industry where
3 United

States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass.
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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monopoly is fragile. I tried to find out where's USM today? Part of
the answer is, with all of the American shoe business having migrated
to Brazil or Italy, and I guess now to China, USM has died a sad
death. But you couldn't break up USM, because it only had a single
factory. Imagine the court entering an order that the east side of the
building would be making one kind of shoe machines, and the west
side of the building would be making another. That simply didn't
make a lot of sense. There were similar arguments in the Microsoft
case.
Christopher mentioned Alcoa. The main reason that divestiture was
not ordered was that between the time the action was brought and the
time the court decided the case, something else happened. It was
called World War II. During World War II, the government had
needs for large quantities of aluminum, and so it sponsored, I think it
was Kaiser and Reynolds, to build aluminum factories, so the
landscape had changed.
The AT&T challenge was a different kind of breakup. It turned out to
be consensual, but it was nonetheless a breakup.
Then, when one thinks about some of these cases in terms of
compensation for the victims, again the poster child there is the
Hanover Shoe4 case, where after USM was subject to various forms
of injunctive relief, it wound up paying at least treble damages,
ironically, to the direct purchasers, who we might say were not really
the ones who were injured, but that's a whole other story.
I wanted to respond briefly to something that Spencer talked about,
and that is the argument that to some observers, the remedies, or the
combination of remedies, are perceived as overkill. I don't mean to
say that they are, but they may be perceived by some as overkill.
Does the existence of those substantial remedies then indeed dovetail
back or circle back into a court's or an administrative agency's
determination as to whether there's a violation in the first place? The
way that courts misuse standing is one of my betes noires, or hobby
horses.
The courts have vastly overused standing rules and sustained
standing challenges because the court didn't like either the
4 Hanover

Shoe.v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 393 U.S. 901 (1968).
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substantive claim, or something that Steve was talking about, the
courts are petrified about discovery or letting these things loose on a
jury and so on. So rather than deal with the merits of the case, they
say, that guy doesn't have standing, or that company doesn't have
standing. And that's a very bad way to ran a railroad.
JEFFERY CROSS: I would like to comment on Ken's point
regarding the Evanston Hospital case. I find the decision very
baffling in terms of the remedy. You will recall that the FTC allowed
Evanston to merge with Highland Park Hospital in the year 2000 and
then in the year 2004 brought a retrospective case looking at that
merger as to whether it had violated Section 7. The Commission
focused on the fact that prices, based on an extensive regression
analysis, including ones by Jon Baker on behalf of the defendants,
were far higher than they would have been but for the merger. There
were also several pages in the decision devoted to the comments of
the executives and the consultant to the effect that the only purpose of
the merger was to raise prices charged managed care organizations.
After doing such a thorough analysis of the anti-competitive effect,
and finding that there was one, the Commission ultimately backed off
a breakup of the merged hospitals and came up with a conduct
remedy.
Such a remedy is contrary to the FTC/DOJ remedy guides that say
that the Agencies prefer structural remedies instead of conduct
remedies. I challenge anyone that has more insight into this than
myself as to how the conduct remedy that was imposed-separate
bargaining units at each hospital for the managed care companies-is
going to be any kind of legitimate remedy. The only explanation I
can think of is that the Commission was perhaps a little nervous
about the fact that it had concluded that the relevant market could be
defined by the fact that prices were above competitive levels that this
was something it felt it was doing that was new, and, therefore, it
needed to back off of the remedy of breaking up this merger after the
fact. It is a baffling remedy. It is, not a Section 2 case, but yet it is
close to it in terms of the analysis because it is looking backward
unlike the usual Section 7 case which is forward looking.
DAVID BRAUN: When we look at the difference in approach to
evaluating the fundamental offense, which then leads to differing
views on remedies in places like Europe and the United States, I'm
reminded that we really have two antitrust laboratories at work. And
it may not be a bad thing at all to have some competition between

2008]

PartIV. Remedies - How Far and How Much?

205

competition systems. And for those laboratories to work, I don't think
it is necessarily harmful or unbeneficial, in most instances, either to
our learning our knowledge or, in fact to, in most instances, the
companies involved. I think one of the things that I've learned, and
most of us who have been in both the government and in private
practice have learned, is that government agencies and courts move at
a snail's pace by comparison to the speed with which private
entrepreneurs, even as large as Microsoft, work. And they are usually
able, no matter what the remedy is, as long as it's not taking the
company away from them, to find a method by which to go after
what they're going after, which is earnings for their company.
So I kind of like the idea that we have some of the competing
systems. I don't find it particularly harmful. And do I see, as I think
some others have mentioned, that we have some overincentives on
the private side of this country that need to be remedied, and we have
some severe underincentives, perhaps, in Europe, but which
Europeans seem to be entirely content with. And I don't think we, at
least I, as an American, ought to be overly encouraging them to go
away. It is not necessarily the right way for them and not necessarily
for us. I would prefer to see treble damages detrebled. I would prefer
to see some stronger incentives in cases where there has been a
proven offense. I think of the situation that we had recently and that
is repeating itself. As soon as an investigation is opened in Europe
and announced publicly, regardless of whether there's an
investigation or any evidence of an offense in the United States, there
are several private treble damage class-actions filed in Philadelphia
or New York or someplace else. And that is a disincentive, I think,
for all of us, because it's a waste of time and a waste of money. It
helps to enrich lawyers, make judges busy, but in many instances, it's
an abuse of the system.
STEVE CALKINS: These are generally hard questions. It used to be
a civil world in the US where the government got an injunction and
then the privates would come along, you'd get money. And, indeed,
ironically, in Evanston, I'm told that the real penalty may be
delivered by privates with some private cases looking for damages
from the Evanston Hospital thing. And that system has got some
problems with it. For instance, when the government can only have
an injunction kind of remedy, the government sort of doesn't like that
and sometimes it wants to go off and punish it a little bit. And in
terms of Evanston, I mean, that's when I think where they said it's
illegal. We need to do something.
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We're afraid of tampering with their integration, and so we're going
to create a totally absurd order, and because we don't know how to
write it, we'll ask the defendants to write it and feel good about
ourselves. At least we've done something to them, and that's too bad.
It would have been better if you're going to decide that it was illegal,
but we don't have a good remedy to put a big fine on them, then
leave them alone to go on their way. And the fact the government
can't do that has problems. The follow-on has problems because we
have this treble damage sort of image out there which tends to drive
the law in another way, and so that's problematic.
Now the situation's been changed because at least at the criminal
level, the federal penalties have become dramatically higher, just
been skyrocketing over the last couple of decades, and so we have
very large federal penalties, maybe not enough, but certainly very
different than when our system was created. So also the Federal
Trade Commission has finally decided that it can get disgorgement in
an antitrust case. It's scared about doing so, it doesn't do it very
often, but it's decided that it's held that it has the power, it hasn't yet
found that rejected, and so at least in theory, the Federal Trade
Commission can go out there and get disgorgement of all these illgotten gains. And so now, unfortunately, we are left with the question
of what is the right way to do this? Should we be having more
disgorgement by a Federal Trade Commission going out to the
people, if you will, and less follow-on litigation from private parties?
Or should the Federal Trade Commission get more disgorgement, the
follow-ons get less? Should we have more money going to the
treasury in terms of criminal fines and less follow-on or not? Of
course, if we knew the right number, all this would be easy. We
don't. And so people on the more enforcement side tend to say more
is better, and those on the less enforcement side say you ought to do
less. But at some point, we have to think about what's the right way
to do this. And each of the different approaches has different cost and
benefits. It creates different incentives. And with the way that the
world has changed so dramatically, it's time that we started thinking
about what is the right way to proceed.
CARLOS ORCI: I had two objectives when I decided to come to
Chicago: the first one was to finish the Marathon, and the second one
was to learn more about the topics we are discussing today. In
Mexico, antitrust law is not as developed as in many other countries
such as the United States, and we therefore look to other
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jurisdictions, principally the, European Community and the United
States, for suggestions as to how to adopt the concepts used in such
jurisdictions to the civil law system used in Mexico. One of the
remedies established in the Mexican Competition Law to determine
the amount of the fine to be imposed upon agents engaging in illegal
conduct is to increase the penalty in the event that the company
repeats the antitrust behavior. In this case, the company may be fined
up to 10 percent of the company's annual sales-not only its
profits-obtained in the previous year or 10 percent of the value of
the assets of the company, whichever is higher. I consider that this
method of calculating fines could be used as a basis for allocating a
fair and sufficient fine in the case of the Microsoft.
ANITA BANICEVIC: One point that I want to throw out there for
discussion is to whether deterrence should, in fact, be the ultimate
goal in unilateral conduct cases, or should it be restoring
competition? The reason I bring that up is that I think that we all
agree that it's often difficult to tell the difference between aggressive
and healthy competition and the line between aggressive competition
and anticompetitive conduct is really quite fact specific. As a result,
there is a significant risk, in my view, that overdeterrence could
easily occur in abuse of dominance cases. Furthermore, does the goal
of deterrence give the regulators the excuse to issue enormous fines
under the guise of deterrence, when ultimately the impact of such
fines is, perhaps, chilling competition. And then the last comment I
want to raise on this point is how the goal of deterrence can be
reconciled with the dicta in Trinko, which refers to the right to earn
monopoly profits and charge monopoly prices.
SPENCER WALLER: Thank you. I want to be a little specific. We
have an array of sanctions in the US and elsewhere, and we kind of
critique them all. One is, you could prosecute monopolization
criminally, the way we do cartels, and we have the ability to levy a
fine, but we don't do that. We haven't done it in the United States
since the late '60s, and almost everybody thinks it's a pretty bad idea,
absent extraordinary, extraordinary conduct that would be probably
criminal under some other statute such as arson or something of that,
if you really were blowing up your competitors. I did a little research,
and I can't find the criminal complaint that is purely Section 2 after
about 1967 or '68. I don't recall the exact dates. So we don't do
criminal sanctions prosecutions and, therefore, under our US system,
give up the right to seek criminal fines. And we all mostly agree that
that's fine.
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We've also moved away from structural remedies, and that becomes
more debatable. But, obviously, if we think the problem is an
enduring structural monopoly, we should probably do something
about it, but absent the fortuitous events of Alcoa where the
government actually b-uilt the plants and then sold them at a discount
to Kaiser and Reynolds. So nothing had to be divested from Alcoa,
but competition could be created anew because of the public property
that was being divested after the war, that's exceptional. And AT&T
is exceptional in the sense that it was consensual. So, it's been awhile
since we have simply forced a recalcitrant defendant to divest
anything outside of the merger area.
Fines by themselves are likely to not be enough, or to be sort of
random and not well correlated to either deterrence or compensation.
And frequently, behavioral injunctions are simply too complicated.
Well, where does that leave us? What other tools do we have, other
than the crisp and clean, occasional structural remedy when it's easy
and nobody really gets hurt too bad.
Let me suggest two things. They don't cover all cases, but they cover
some cases. One is, I've spent a lot of time thinking about the right
to access and open access regimes, which we frequently call the
Essential Facilities Doctrine in antitrust. It's not the only way we
think about it. I'm convinced in a world where most of the important
industries have an intellectual property component or a technology
component or an internet component, that access is the most
important issue going forward relating to monopoly power in most of
our systems.
Microsoft is an example. It was all about access, as was Trinko and a
bunch of other cases. And I think we need remedies that are about
access. If we look at what Microsoft, what happened in Europe, I
think, ironically, what Microsoft proposed as a remedy for the media
players was probably better access than what the Commission
insisted on and what the court upheld. If the idea is we don't want to
let Microsoft use its bottleneck through its operating system to deny
downstream diversity and choice and consumer welfare and all the
different senses, then, gee, I think it's a lot better to at least have
Microsoft hand out its competitors a disk, especially if that's what
they're willing to do, rather than just have them sell an unbundled
version of what they're selling bundled and then leaving consumers
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having to figure out how to get access on their own. So on the record,
I just said something nice about Microsoft.
The second half of the EU case was about access of a different sort.
And both sides agreed that access was the issue, they just disagreed
factually whether Microsoft was providing it or not, and the
Commission found not enough, and the Court upheld that. We'll see
where it goes. But I think one aspect of this is to focus on access and
devise intelligent, functional remedies that provides that access, yes,
even if it does involve resurrecting things like the essential facilities
doctrine, but also using non-antitrust, non-traditional regulatory and
other tools to provide that kind of access.
The second thing is I think we need to move to a better system of
public/private partnerships to enforce competition law, and I think
it's absolutely critical in the abuse of dominance and monopolization
area. I think we have to move away from public agencies trying to
monopolize the enforcement of competition law, particularly in this
area of power. There is often a role for private enforcement, not
always. And again, Microsoft is a peculiar example, because it's not
clear they were overcharging for anything. At least some of the
things that they were held to do unlawfully in the DC circuit opinion
don't involve an apparent overcharge, and a private party who seeks
to prove that is starting at ground zero, doesn't have much to rely on
from the government case.
Now, because we don't have the power to fine, maybe we want to
have more cases go to a verdict. Maybe we need setting up where
there is an where there isn't overcharges and having the government
cases then be the vehicle to set up private liability actions to then find
where the overcharges are. Maybe disgorgement is a powerful tool
that we ought to figure out how to use beyond just the very limited
Federal Trade Commission context, or maybe, when there are
government consent decrees, we ought to spend a little more time on
the disgorgement or compensation aspects of whatever it is the
defendant would then have to do to make consumers right, either at
the direct purchaser level and/or at the indirect purchaser level. So I
can see a lot of creative and interesting things.
I'm troubled by when the agencies have centralized the bulk of the
enforcement activity in this area and then further use their power to
kind of shut private parties out of the process in different ways. I'd
like to see a much more constructive partnership. And that's the only
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model that I would offer to the EU and other jurisdictions. And I
agree with David, I'm not offering the specifics of the US model or
any other specific suggestion, but this idea that it needs to be a
seamless web to have the best array of governmental enforcement
and private enforcement options, damages and access kinds of things.
BERT FOER: I want to make four points, and I'm going to come
back in my last point to what Spencer was saying. The first point is
that in the US, remedy has been the tail on the dog. It has not been
wagging the dog. It's something that gets thought of at the last
minute with the least resources, although the FTC made some efforts
to change that, which I think is very positive. One result, or one
manifestation is this: think of the treatise on antitrust remedies that
you go to when you're researching the law or economics of remedy.
There is none, right? Why not? And isn't it time that a real effort be
made to go through antitrust cases, figure out what the remedies
were, put them into some patterns, and also attempt to evaluate what
has worked and what hasn't worked, such that there is a body of
systematic knowledge? I don't think it exists, but such a project
might be very helpful in moving toward the future of remedies. Of
course, that involves more than just monopoly. But it is a place to
start from.
And that gets to a point that is made very often, which is that we need
more studies of what has worked, what hasn't worked, evaluation of
decisions that were made or decisions that were not made. That is a
resource problem. Everybody agrees that we need more of this but it
is comparable to everybody talking about the weather and nobody
doing anything about it.
This leads to one of my favorite points that one day I'll try and do
something about: developing the role of prediction in antitrust. All
antitrust is mostly about prediction, but nowhere is this more true
than when we deal with remedies. What will happen if we do X, or
what will happen if we don't do X, and what will happen if we do X
as compared to Y and so forth? We don't put resources into the
science of prediction. Clearly, it's not a very precise science, but
corporations pay a lot of money for forecasters, demographers,
planners, and futures researchers. There are systematic techniques
and methodologies that are used. Some work, some don't work,
some may be applicable in different circumstances to antitrust. I think
we need to study what methods of prediction might help us with the
remedy phase.
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And my final point is about the potential for creativity in settlements
and cy pres distributions that can affect the competitive situation in a
monopoly base.
Moving closer to what Spencer may be getting at, the State of Utah
brought a case against two medical waste disposal companies. The
two leading companies were in this state. They made a decision to
swap assets. One would stay in this state, one would operate in an
adjacent state, then you would have two states where there was no
competition in either. Obtaining a conviction wouldn't have been
hard, so the State was able to negotiate a strong settlement. But the
company that had left the state was unwilling to come back into the
state.
So now what do you do to create some competition where there had
been? One of the things the state did was to force the settling
company to put up some money, and they distributed that money in
several ways-one was a very intelligent distribution. They funded
the creation of a tool kit by the AAI, which laid out the nature of the
medical waste management industry, showing the legal and economic
aspects that are of antitrust relevance, and providing strategies that
can be used by all the states and the federal government to protect
competition in this industry.
But I want to call attention to a different aspect of the settlement.
The Utah antitrust authorities gave money out from the settlement
fund directly to potential competitors of the remaining monopolist,
and the idea was to build these companies up so they could compete
more effectively. This particular effort at industrial policy didn't
work. It didn't work because -the beneficiary companies couldn't
get the proper zoning in order to create the necessary competing
facilities. Nonetheless, it's an interesting idea. It does raise questions
about what we would call industrial policy. And, of course, that's
almost as bad a word as "populist," which Spencer may have earned
for himself earlier today. I mean, in this field, to be called a populist
or to be engaged in industrial planning is absolutely a death sentence.
But we need to think outside of the box.
Take the Evanston case. Suppose the FTC had said, well, it's too late
to break up the merged hospital company, but the two hospitals that
merged made all this extra money out of an illegal merger. Let's take
that money and put it into the creation, maybe not of a whole
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hospital, which perhaps would have been too expensive, but some
sort of a facility that would have provided competition for at least
some of the departments of the hospital. There are creative
approaches to be examined in antitrust remedies. It's a lot like
bankruptcy, where there are opportunities for very creative remedies
if people are willing to try. And, for a variety of reasons including the
conservative bias against government being able to operate in the
public interest, I don't think there's been enough effort to think and
act creatively in this field.
PHILIP MARSDEN: I think that's right. In Europe, they're looking
quite hard at some of the work that the FTC has been doing on
looking back at whether intervention worked and to what extent it
happened to benefit consumer welfare. And the OFT was engaged in
a study on that. And the European Commission did that with respect
to its merger remedies. And, of course, the whole purpose of this is to
work out how better to estimate what their future intervention may
be. With respect to predictive abilities, I do have to wonder how
much predictive ability the European Commission has hen you look
at the tying remedies in Europe in Microsoft, I think making sure that
the unbundled product, with less bells and whistles on it, was going
to be sold at the same price. You don't need to be able to have a
degree in predictive science or whatever to work out what is going to
happen then.
BERT FOER: It's not that nobody told them.
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE: David advocated detrebling damages. I
just didn't want there to be a transcript that didn't have a defense of
trebling. Two responses: The first is that trebled damages do not
necessarily play a significant role in antitrust class action litigation.
The bogeyman of trebled damages is most often brought up in the
context of class-action litigation. The whole class gets together, and
with all the damages aggregated and trebled, that it's going to
decimate the poor legal monopolist. But antitrust class-action
litigation almost inevitably settles. Those settlements have to be
approved by the federal judge, but the benchmark for approving the
settlements in Section 2 class-action cases is single damages, not
treble damages. So the settlements in these cases are invariably a
fraction of single damages, often as low as 5, 10, 20 percent of single
damages. So even though you've got class-actions and a possibility
of treble damages, these class-action litigations are not disgorging the
ill-gotten gains.
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Second, independently of that, trebling is defensible because
disgorgement - in the form of single damages - alone isn't enough.

Disgorgement is necessary, but it's not sufficient. If the penalty for
robbing a bank is the robber has to give the money back, then people
will rob banks, because as long as there's a minor probability that
they'll get away with it, robbing banks is a net positive thing to do: if
they're caught, they give the money back, and if they're not caught,
they get to keep it. We need to have trebling in order to compensate
for the fact that at least some Section 2 violations aren't going to be
caught. Some of them are self-concealing, like Walker Process patent
fraud cases, and some of them just don't make it through because of
these tightened standing requirements that eliminate some legitimate
suits. So it seems to me that trebling is important to ensure
disgorgement and to also make it more likely that firms considering
illegal monopolization will determine that it's not going to be cost
beneficial for them.
I'd like to quickly segue that back to Spencer's point on
disgorgement alone isn't enough. It seems to me we need to take a
multi-prong approach. And when you find a Section 2 violation, then
you need to come in with all remedies swinging. You need to
disgorge, you need to penalize in order to make it so people will be
deterred from violating antitrust laws in the future, and then you need
to find a way to fix the market within the context of that particular
market, whether it's a structural or conduct remedy. But it seems to
me that if each one of these remedies alone is insufficient, then that's
a really good reason where we should come in with all of the arrows
in our quiver and try to use them as a multi-prong remedy.
PETER CARSTENSEN: Thank you. I want to quickly go back over
this structure and conduct remedy stuff with a couple of observations.
First Alcoa. Let's not forget that we did get a remedy there. The
Mellons had to give up their ownership of the Aluminum Company
of Canada, which has emerged as a competitor over time. AT&T, I
think, is one of the best structural cases that I can think of in terms of
freeing up technology. Think of the dramatic changes, things that
were in Bell Labs that got loose once AT&T was broken up. Now
they're reconstructing it to lock in the present technology. But these
two observations-and Bert's talking about alternative ways to deal
with the path dependency that we were on, because that had been one
of my observations when I looked at some of these arguments about
the harm of antitrust in the past is that antitrust remedies need to
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combine with some major change in technology or
other context for
5
there to be a significant change in the marketplace.
We had a case a little like Bert's that I don't know the outcome of,
but the Marshfield Clinic6 private damage case, the money was used
to subsidize competing doctors to come into the Marshfield Clinic
monopoly area and begin to build a practice. But that suggests-and
I'll pick up a little bit on Simon's concerns with how his clients were
being told not to cut prices-that if the focus of remedy is on the
dynamics of the market and changing the path dependency that we're
on, then things that force up the price in the short run of the dominant
firm that allow competitors to reestablish themselves in the market
may make a good deal of sense from a remedy perspective if what
you're trying to do is to restore a competition that has been lost for
some exogenous or endogenous reason.
On the other hand, if you really think, as I think Scalia does, that
monopoly is inevitable, then all you do is screw the consumer,
because nothing is really going to change when you do this. But then
you may-you do get into regulatory models. That is, no, I don't
want you treating consumers differently. I want you to market your
ridiculous operating system this way rather than that way. So it
becomes much more purely regulatory, and I think, falls out of
competition policy.
STEVE CALKINS: Very quickly. I was reminded by Bert's
comment about Utah, about just how hard all this stuff is. In my
case, the Federal Trade Commission sued the Detroit Auto Dealers,
which had conspired to remain closed on Saturday. They more or
less won the case. They got an order which required a variety of
things. And those things happened, and years later, the dealers
remained closed on Saturday. They'd been doing it for a long time,
and they just continued doing it, and the Federal Trade Commission
couldn't do a whit of good. And it is so terribly hard. You know,
Microsoft loses a case involving Netscape Navigator long after
Netscape Navigator is gone, for all practical purposes.
In Europe, none of you seem to think that the Media Player option is
going to make a whit of difference, and that doesn't seem surprising
5 Peter C. Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the American
Economy: Examining History or Tehorizing, 74 IOWA L. REv. 175 (1989).
6 Roxema v. Marshfield Clinic, 977 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D.Wis. 1997).
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to anybody. It's very hard to do much good when you have any kind
of a remedy that's coming along after the fact.
So what do you take away from that? One is that you need aggressive
merger enforcement to prevent the establishment of monopolies. You
need to try to do what you can to make sure that entry is easy in
various parts of the economy so that monopolies don't get
established. But where you do have monopolies, you really ought to
act fast. If you can identify in a case of Conwood that people are
going around ripping out racks and things and you can get in there
and stop it quickly before someone has too much power, that's a
whole lot better than trying to come along and bribe somebody to
enter the market years later. So speed is one lesson. And then
another, to go back to where we started this morning, is clarity.
Where you can really be certain you know what's illegal, you can act
more quickly, counselors can counsel against it. And when people do
it, it can be sufficiently, morally contemptible that when Christopher
wants to come in with this I hurt him both guns and arrows blazing
and flying, well, there will be some kind of support for doing that,
and so it's all part of one big picture.
KEN DAVIDSON: I think we have gotten more imaginative along
the lines that Spencer mentioned in things like access remedy. But I
think further that fundamentally we have not had enough study of
remedy and what it's worth and what it's not. I would say most of the
regulatory remedies, access remedies in particular that have been
tried at the Federal Trade Commission have not worked. We didn't
know enough about them. We didn't know enough about remedy.
There is no book on remedy. And I think it's very important for us to
get, in a general way, the word out as what works and what does not
work and why they don't work. I know in my own case, I have
worked on a whole bunch of remedies with total failures, and they
were total failures because we didn't understand enough about the
industry when we designed the remedy. Well, maybe that's too bad,
or maybe it's too late. In some cases, it's too late and you can't do
anything the way you're trying to do it.
But the one point that is most important, I think, is to line up these
remedies, look at the remedies, look at where they failed. We can
learn from that. I'm afraid that our one experience with doing that,
the divestiture study, both in the EU and the one that we did at the
FTC, was a substantial learning experience, and it has resulted in
ever-more complicated remedies. That is probably not a good result,
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because the more complicated remedies deny what competition law is
supposed to be fostering, namely markets and interplay of market
action. You have to be looking towards something that is going to
reestablish competition, and without looking to see what the effect
has been, we're not going to know.
ANDRE FIEBIG: I just wanted to perhaps ask Christopher and
maybe Peter, whether they would impose the same remedies had
Microsoft, the first time the practices were questioned, complied with
the European Commission's remedies? In other words, do you give
any credit to Microsoft for the inherent ambiguity of competition
laws? In other words, is there any justice in saying, well, did
Microsoft say I didn't know that it was illegal? What if at the time
they said, gee, I'm sorry? We didn't know it was illegal. We'll do
whatever you say.
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE: I guess I'd fight the premise. I find that a
little disingenuous. You're suggesting that Microsoft didn't know
that lying about making polluted Java and then growing polluted Java
as part of its strategy, of lying to software developers to focus them
on Microsoft's version of Java that was not compatible with other
versions. To suggest Microsoft didn't know that was wrong, I just
can't buy that premise.
ANDRE FIEBIG: But it happens all the time, I mean, even by nondominant. To get to be dominant, you have to do that.
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE: Yeah, bad acts happen all the time by
firms. When they say that they're shocked, shocked, that their bad
act might violate the law, I'm just not willing to say, oh, okay, lower
the fine for you. I think that regardless of when you come in with
Microsoft that you have to have some attempts to calculate what the
illegal profits they gained were and to disgorge them. And I disagree
with Spencer. I think there were illegal overcharges. It's not your
traditional - a calculation where you observe the competitive market
price and then watch the price go up. Illegal overcharges exist
because, but for Microsoft's anticompetitive acts, you would have
had an emergence of competing operating systems that would have
driven the market price down. It's really hard to calculate with any
precision, but given the violation, that must have happened that there
was an overcharge going on. I think you employ the economist to
come in and come up with some estimate of what their illegal profits
were, and I think you have that as the minimum to disgorge, and then
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you have to have something more than that to compensate for the fact
that there wasn't 100 percent probability of them being found liable
and getting that disgorgement. And after you disgorge all the illgotten gains and put in a penalty, then you find a way to go forward
with the structural remedy like the EU did.
ANDRE FIEBIG: But do you give them a credit for the clarity or
lack of clarity of the legal norm?
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE: At its core, Microsoft is not an unclear
case. I'm baffled when people think that this is the cutting edge of
antitrust. This was a garden-variety antitrust violation that just
happened to take place in a high-tech market. But there wasn't
anything new and innovative, and no brand-new antitrust law was
created in this case. It was just the application of bread-and-butter
antitrust principles in a high-tech industry. So, no, I don't give a
whole lot of credit when Microsoft says "we didn't realize that trying
to dry up every possible distribution network for our competitors and
then lying to our own customers, the people that we're dependent on,
we didn't realize that getting a monopoly through those acts was
wrong." I'm just not willing to give any credit for that.
PETER CARSTENSEN: You're a Mac user, aren't you? Imagine not
Microsoft, but another monopolist who engages in some practices
that, when we take a look at them, think about them and have some
sophisticated analysis, we then say these really have much more of a
foreclosure effect on competition then that ought to have. Hence, we
tell the monopolist henceforth don't do it. That's where to keep the
market open would make a lot of difference to me. How early do we
seek a remedy, and what kind of remedies other than just stop doing
it, would be important. How much of other sanctions would I want to
have? A monopolist engaged only in innocat conduct, now revealed
to be anticompetitive has yet, I think, to actually walk the face of the
earth. But when, as, and if that happens, then I think we really do
have to think about how draconian we want to be with our remedies
when we really discover a practice we always thought was a good
one and it turns out to be a bad one.
SPENCER WALLER: Well, I thank you for a great day. I just want
to close with a couple of comments. I guess I want to do like the
McLaughlin Group does with John McLaughlin who usually saves
the zinger for the end. But when we're thinking about remedies, I just
want you to go away with a really interesting thought that we don't
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have time to talk about it today. But Andre asked a what-if question
about Microsoft. I'll ask another what-if question. What if once it
became clear that they had durable market power over operating
systems, and what if once it became clear they engaged in conduct
that was illegal under one or more of the jurisdiction laws, what if the
remedy was the forced licensing or auction of the source code for
Windows? What would the world like look that we live in today?
And with that, I thank you, and I look forward to seeing you at other
Institute events and carrying on this conversation in London in April.
We have been discussing a series of questions we've been dealing
with since the beginning of competition law, and we'll be dealing
with them for quite some time. Philip, as our host of the next leg of
the marathon, gets the final word.
PHILIP MARSDEN: Thank you very much for a great day. I
welcome you all to come to London on April 11 th next year for
exactly the same format and with some lawyers and economists from
the UK and from the continent, I hope. One of the things we've been
talking about all day, of course, is apt for running analogies, which is,
you know, are those dominant firms, or Microsoft, are they doing
something other than pulling ahead of their rivals in the race through
their own ingenuity, or are they, indeed, excluding their rivals from
the race? I know there are various views on that around the table,
and there certainly are in London. The marathon discussion is
certainly not over.
Thank you, Spencer for hosting this first stage in the Marathon.
Thank you to the court reporters and to the students for helping us,
and thank you all.

